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Abstract
What does politics have to do with aesthetics? Surely, both
politics and aesthetics are concerned with imagining,
envisioning, and even creating, yet aren't the kinds of things
these fields of inquiry imagine, envision and create greatly
disparate? Jacques Rancière argues that what is at stake in
politics, just as it is in aesthetics, is the distribution of the
sensible, and that politics happens not only through the
disruption of a certain aesthetic organization of sense
experience but through the eruption of a distinct aesthetics.
Here I elaborate the Kantian foundation for Rancière's
conception of the kind of aesthetics that politics must disrupt,
drawn primarily from the Critique of Pure Reason. Yet I also
look to Kant's Critique of Judgment to pave the way for the
kind of aesthetics Rancière understands as synonymous with
the political event. With this gesture, my intention is, first, to
provide further support for Rancière's call for a distinct
aesthetics by elaborating upon how such a distinct aesthetics
may be both possible and realizable. Yet my intention is also
polemical. Rancière is highly critical of the political potential to
be found in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, namely due to
the onus placed on the project of 'becoming-imperceptible,' a
notion which, Rancière claims, leads politics to a dead end. Is
not the Deleuzian turn towards imperceptibility a move
altogether away from any aesthetics? Here, I argue that it is
vital to identify Deleuze's notion of the imperceptible, like
Rancière's politics, as situated in an engagement with Kantian
aesthetics. It is only through attention to Deleuze's reading of
Kant's Critique of Judgment that it becomes evident that the
'imperceptible' for Deleuze is also the 'percipiendum': that
which must be perceived but cannot be perceived according to
the delimitation of sense experience in the sensus communis.
Through attention to Deleuze's own Kantian interlude, then, a
political voice can be discerned in his philosophy in spite of
Rancière's reservations. If we care about Rancière's 'Politics of
Aesthetics,' we should care about this.
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1. Introduction
Jacques Rancière's Dis-agreement, as Rancière writes in his
subsequent work, The Politics of Aesthetics, explores "the
distribution of the sensible at stake in any politics".[1] How is
this phrase 'the distribution of the sensible' to be understood
and why does the distribution of the sensible bear such a
relation to politics? Dis-agreement tells us that politics first
becomes a possibility with the institution of a community,
where a community itself begins with something in common.
This commonality is no shared stock of goods or shared claim
to a territory. Rather, it is a shared partition of the sensible:
community pivots around common modalities of sense. In
other words, the commonality upon which a community is
founded is sense, and politics first becomes a possibility with
the institution of common sense. Hand in hand with the
disclosure of shared modalities of sensing, moreover, comes
the delimitation of each modality. The partition of the sensible
thus renders some sounds intelligible (logos) and others
unintelligible (pathos), some capacities visible and other
invisible, and more. Moreover, social positions are portioned
out according to these delimitations, and the partitioning of
the sensible upon which the community is founded ultimately
determines which people are recognizable as part of a shared
world and which are sanctioned in partaking of it. Yet the
moment politics becomes possible is distinct from the moment
politics erupts -- politics is a much rarer thing than common
sense or the institution of a community. For Rancière, politics
is that rare event that occurs when the confluence between
sanctioned dispositions to partake of the shared world and
positions within the partition of the sensible is ruptured.
Politics not only interrupts common sense but also erupts into
the shared sensible world.
As the title suggests, The Politics of Aesthetics argues that the
distribution of the sensible is an aesthetic enterprise, and what
is at stake in any politics is aesthetics. Drawing this correlation
between aesthetics and the distribution of the sensible and,
ultimately, between aesthetics and politics requires a precise
understanding of the term. Aesthetics is not any set of artistic
practices nor is it the general theory that concerns these
practices. Indeed, aesthetics for Rancière is not even a theory
of sense experience at large. Rather, if the correlation between
politics and aesthetics is to be exposed, Rancière insists
aesthetics must be understood in the terms of Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason. Aesthetics is "the system of a priori forms
determining what presents itself to sense experience."[2]
Moreover, Rancière claims the relation aesthetics bears to
politics is analogous to the relation Kant's a priori forms bear
to sense experience. Just as these a priori forms determine
the organization of human experience and provide its
conditions, aesthetics comes in various structural systems that
serve both to condition the shared world of our daily
experience and to partition that world and delimit the positions
one might occupy within it. Politics is not reducible to this
partitioning of the sensible on the condition of aesthetic
systems, yet it is conditioned by aesthetics, just as sense
experience is conditioned by the a priori, according to the
Critique of Pure Reason, insofar as it requires the partitions of
the sensible as its space of disruption.
In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière moves quickly on to
undertake a Foucaultian historiography of distinct artistic
practices and systems, illuminating the subject positions they
make possible as well as the political systems with which they
are synonymous. Here, however, I pause to reflect on the
significance of Rancière's Kantian interlude. Returning to the
insights of Dis-agreement, with Rancière's subsequent insights
into the correlation between aesthetics and politics at hand, I
hope to illuminate why and in what manner politics requires
the disruption of aesthetics, understood, in the terms of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, as the structural system organizing
human sense experience. In addition, I follow up Rancière's
further claim that politics likewise requires the inauguration of
a distinct aesthetics that will not replace the partitions of the
sensible that give us a shared sensible world but will erupt
from within them. This distinct aesthetics, I assert, also has its
elucidation in Kant's critical philosophy. However, I shall press
that it is Kant's last critical project, the Critique of Judgment
and not the earlier Critique of Pure Reason, that offers such an
aesthetics.
Rancière misses this moment in Kant, as he derives his
conception of Kantian aesthetics primarily from the Critique of
Pure Reason, a text concerned first and foremost with the
conditions of possibility for the world as we know it, where it is
the later Critique of Judgment that explores sense beyond the
limits of our understanding. The later might be called real
sense, in contrast to the merely conceptually possible sense of
the Critique of Pure Reason. A turn to the Critique of
Judgment and its alternative elucidation of sense aids
Rancière's 'Politics of Aesthetics' by providing this concept with
a philosophical backbone and support for which his Foucaultian
historiography at times is wanting. The Critique of Judgment
distinguishes between two kinds of aesthetic experiences,
experiences of the beautiful and of the sublime. While both
offer insights into sense beyond the limits of the understanding
and its correlated concepts, I want to argue that Kant's
encounter with the sublime is much richer in its attunement to
the interruption of the partitions of the sensible, or, in Kant's
terms, the a priori structures of human experience, by a
distinct aesthetics. Indeed, I shall use Kant's articulations of
the aesthetic experience of the sublime as a foil for further
elucidation of Rancière's notion of the partitioning of the
sensible.[3]
In addition to aspiring to better substantiate philosophically
the correlation Rancière makes between politics and
aesthetics, this turn to Kant's Critique of Judgment is also
polemical. Rancière, in his article "Deleuze, Bartleby, and the
Literary Formula," writes that the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze
erects an impasse for politics.[4] Deleuze places
'imperceptibility' at the heart of a project to give birth to a
new kind of community, a new kind of relationality between
beings in the world. If politics occurs in a forced eruption into
the sensible of that which aesthetic systems, conceived on the
model of the a priori, render insensible through a partaking in
and of common sense, how could imperceptibility be political?
Is not the Deleuzian turn towards imperceptibility a move
altogether away from any partaking in a shared, sensory
world? Here, I want to argue that it is vital to identify
Deleuze's notion of the imperceptible, like Rancière's politics,
as situated in an engagement with Kantian aesthetics. The
'imperceptible' is only so from a particular perspective, that of
the Kantian object-form, the condition of perception in Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, and the sensus communis in which it
is key. This form is disrupted however, as Deleuze tells us, by
the force of the real itself. The imperceptible is a part of this
force and party to this disruption, functioning aesthetically as
the 'percipiendum', that which must be perceived but cannot
be perceived according to the delimitation of sense experience
in the sensus communis. Indeed, it may be what Deleuze does
with Kant's Critique of Judgment more than Kant's work itself
that provides the philosophical backbone for Rancière's 'Politics
of Aesthetics' and, through attention to Deleuze's own Kantian
interlude, a political voice can be discerned in his philosophy in
spite of Rancière's reservations. This is the key polemical
assertion of this essay. However, one aspiration of this essay
is to inspire further inquiries into the resonances between the
work of Deleuze and Rancière despite Rancière's own
reservations. Thus I add in passing that insofar as Deleuze
remains first and foremost a philosopher, it may be only
through Rancière's own Kantian interlude, revealing the
political implications of aesthetics systems modeled like the
Kantian a priori to which Deleuze, drawing on Kant's later
Critique of Judgment, offers an alternative, that the possibility
for a passage to politics from Deleuze is opened. Rather than
illuminating the impasse Deleuze sends politics hurtling into,
Rancière may instead point Deleuze's philosophy towards a
political passage.
2. The Perceptible and the Beautiful
In Dis-agreement, Rancière employs Aristotle's political
philosophy to illuminate the pivotal role partitions of the
sensible play in the institution of community. Although
Rancière's primary engagement with the notion of an
aesthetics of politics comes in his The Politics of Aesthetics,
engagement with this notion in Dis-agreement sets the stage.
Here, I employ Kant's articulation of the aesthetic experience
of the beautiful in the Critique of Judgment in order to
corroborate Rancière's later claim that any partitioning of the
sensible is always conditioned by a certain aesthetic system.
Aristotle's political community, I want to argue, is instituted
according to the rules and principles of the aesthetic
experience of the beautiful, itself conceived by Kant at least in
the early stages of the Critique of Judgment's development
according to the a priori rules and principles of human
understanding.
For Aristotle, the institution of a political community requires
first the existence of a being whose nature is political: the
human being. It is logos - the capacity to reason and to
express claims about justice and injustice through speech -
that marks the human as such an animal by nature. Logos is
for Aristotle set apart from pathos - the capacity to express
pain and pleasure. It is here, at the foundation of the
Aristotelian political community, that Rancière finds lodged a
partition of the sensible, a distinction "between two modes of
access to sense experience:" logos, rendering sensible a world
of justice and injustice, and pathos, restricting the sensible to
the domain of pain and pleasure.[5] Capacities in not only
sensing but expressing what is sensed are the hinge upon
which the institution of a political community pivots,
simultaneous with a delimitation of who will and will not
partake of that community.
Furthermore, it is insofar as logos is a modality of sense
revealing a world of justice and injustice that logos is requisite
for entry into a political community, and thus, Rancière
pushes, it is precisely the appearance of such relations that
marks this community as political. What, then, are relations of
justice and injustice and how do they configure the sensible?
Aristotle, like Plato, opposes any notion of justice that would
reduce it to a question of profits and losses weighed against
one another, such that what is just is only so from the
perspective of a single profiting party, and what is unjust is in
turn only so from the perspective of a correlative party
harmed. This logic might be called mercantile, whereas the
logic of justice, in contrast, pivots around relations of
domination and dominance, ordered in accordance with each
person's nature. One is positioned within the community so as
to give to it that which is properly theirs to give and, in
portion, take from it that which is properly theirs to take. In
relations of justice there is no 'harm' correlated with profit the
inferior party, for example the son, benefits from being ruled
over by his father, the older and wiser of the pair. Thus,
coextensive with the modality of sense experience
characteristic of logos is the sensible emergence of a world
composed of proper parts (those with a capacity for logos,
rather than simply pathos) as well as, between these parts,
proper relations (those which accord with the nature of the
parts correlated). When a proper part takes a proper place - a
place proportional to what that part brings to the community,
a relation of justice holds; when either improper parts or
improper relations appear on a shared horizon, injustice.
Rancière, however, will question to what extent improper parts
and improper relations can register sensibly at all. Those who
can be taken account of in the political community are always
already those who can be counted, those who make up some
recognizable part. It is not clear that those, to whom is
attributed the capacity for pathos alone, for example, can be
'heard.' This is not to say that their voices simply do not
register audibly but that they register only in an
unrecognizable modality. Their words register much like a
buzzing or humming in the air of which no intelligible sense
can be made. The same will be true of any claim that does not
fall in its proper place. For example, Rancière writes that
historically the partition of the sensible was such that the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the characteristics of a
working day were perceived to have nothing to do with one
another, and it was worker's strikes that forced the
community to perceive the relationship between the two
differently.[6]
It is thus that the task of politics becomes one of producing
and forcing into everyday experience a distinct organization of
the sensible, conditioned by a distinct aesthetics. This task
demands reconfiguring the limits of each of our senses, and
their relations to one another. Offering another historical
example to support his claims, Rancière writes that the
plebeians of Aventine realized this necessity. In order that
their speech, registering as mere background noise in the
current sensory order, would be heard, they spoke in an
overall sensory context mimicking that of their patricians. Just
like their patricians, "they pronounce imprecations and
apotheoses; they delegate one of their number to go and
consult their oracles, and they give themselves representatives
by rebaptizing them."[7]
With Rancière's rendering of Aristotle's conception of justice as
a partitioning of the sensible, I argue, resonates a Kantian
refrain. Kant's critical philosophy marks out two distinct
domains: the transcendental realm of a priori forms and the
empirical realm of sensible matter (the phenomena). Despite a
strict delineation of the two, Kant critical philosophy works to
articulate the process by which the a priori structures of
human subjectivity are mapped onto the sensible, phenomenal
domain. Indeed, it is in this project that Kant's philosophical
project finds much of its normative thrust. The shared sensory
world is configured ethically for Kant only when it takes a
shape expressive of the higher nature of the human being
granted to that being by the transcendental form of human
subjectivity.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, as Daniel W. Smith explains,
the form given to the phenomenal through reflection of the
transcendental is what Kant calls the "object = x."[8] This is
an empty form that only receives qualitative specifications
when related to a multiplicity of phenomenal qualia held
together through mental operations. White, thin, and sheet-
like bark, dark-black knots, and a thin trunk, for example, are
synthesized together mentally to form the object known as a
birch tree. Moreover, Kant claims it is such a synthesis that
allows the various qualitative impressions had of the birch
tree, the sun, one's own hand, and more to be shared
between the various faculties. It is because of this synthesis
that the same qualia present themselves when, for example, I
imagine a birch tree as when I conceptualize one. Pushing
Kant's claim further, it might be posited that this synthesis is
also what allows each of our various senses to present the
same object to us such that when I put my hand to the white
sheet-like bark of the tree, the feel of the bark indicates it is a
birch tree I am touching, just as the visual appearance of its
knots and leaves likewise indicates.
However, the object-form is not itself a transcendental form
but rather an analogue of such a form. What of the
transcendental human subject has the capacity to produce an
analogue of itself that conditions a shared sensory world? The
cogito. The cogito for Kant is a unity prior conditionally to all
empirical experience. It is the "I think" which gives to the
human being a subjecthood by which it can then reach out to
the world and make it one's own. Nonetheless, the cogito is
neither individual nor personal. Rather, it is the universal form
of reason in general. Thus, as an analogue of the cogito, the
object-form renders a shared, sensory world not only for one's
own senses and faculties but also for one person and another.
It is in Kant's Critique of Judgmentand not the Critique of Pure
Reason that the question of the communication between the
empirical and the transcendental comes to the fore. By way of
analogy, Kant here further explores the relation between two
mental faculties or a priori formative powers of subjectivity
distinguished in the Critique of Pure Reason: the faculty of
cognition, with understanding as its primary modality, and the
faculty of feeling pleasure and pain, with imagination as its
operative expression. Imagination is the mode by which the
subject reaches out to the sensible. In the Critique of Pure
Reason Kant insists that the sensible can only be received in a
form conditioned by the structure of the human understanding.
Nonetheless, in the Critique of Judgment he is struck by the
sensible's capacity to manifest structural organization beyond
that which the understanding can conceptualize in terms of the
object form. All structural organization manifested in the
sensible which is beyond the possibility of understanding is
organization manifest in a particular, empirical phenomenon.
The understanding finds structure only in subsuming the
particular under a general concept, never in the particular
itself. Yet the sensible can manifest a regularity without
recognizable specificities; a regularity that can't be referred
back to any concepts the understanding already has.
Conceptual matches are made only on the basis of specific
regularities which a concept can be recognized to repeat itself
in. The concept of a straight line, for example, is matched with
any empirical instantiation of the shortest path between two
points. Thus, the regularity cannot be referred back to
concepts and thus to the activity of understanding as its a
priori ground.
The aesthetic experience of the beautiful is one example of the
manifestation of such regularity in the particular. It is, Kant
tells us, a single rose that one finds beautiful, not roses in
general, due to a certain harmony or proportionality that
appears to us in it.[9] Kant here puts an onus on appearance.
It is not clear that the regularity is there in the sensible itself
but only that it is there in the sensible for us. Beyond the
limits of the understanding, then, any apparent reference of
empirical phenomena to an a priori ground both preceding and
making it possible is not clearly a necessary fact but only a
subjective need. We cannot presuppose "that every thinking
and cognizing being is subject to the same need as a
necessary condition, and hence that this condition attaches to
the object rather than merely to our selves as subjects."[10]
Nonetheless, we can suppose every human being shares this
need, and the aesthetic comprehension of the beautiful is thus
posed to play a key role in the ethical configuration of the
shared world of human experience.
There are two parallels with Aristotle to be drawn from this.
First, it is from this transcendental form, unique to human
beings as creatures of consciousness and reason, that a
shared sensory world is produced, with each of the senses as
well as each of the faculties taking a proper place in this
production. This sounds much like Aristotle's account of the
coming to be of the community as rendered by Rancière, a
coming to be of a common sensory world. The similarities
suggest that Kant's account of the ethical configuration of
human experience, begun in the Critique of Pure Reason and
carried over into the Critique of Judgment's account of the
aesthetic expression of beauty, can likewise be characterized
in Rancière's terms as the very 'distribution of the sensible' at
stake for politics. Kant's positioning and partitioning of the
senses and the faculties will ultimately translate ethically into
the positioning and partitioning of various beings (some of
them barely registering on this continuum of humanity at all)
and result, as Rancière reminds us, in such events as the
Scythian's "customarily put[ting] out the eyes of those they
reduced to slavery, the better to restrict them to their tasks as
slaves, which was to milk the livestock."[11]
Second, just as Aristotle pushes away from a mercantile logic
that renders justice a question of point of view, the
universality of the cogito as a transcendental form pushes
away from an overly empirical perspective to render within the
sensible its higher, ethical expression. However, it might be
thought that to move away from the empirical with Kant is to
move away from the very logic of natural parts and their
proper relations that Aristotle posits as an alternative. Yet
although Rancière does indeed emphasize the empirical nature
of Aristotle's rendition of politics, he places, in addition, an
onus on proportionality. What one takes -a place in the
community - is always proportional to that which one brings to
it, that is, certain capacities to make, say, see and do that
supposedly belong to us by nature. Proportionality is the
element in Aristotle's rendition of the political community that
gives it harmony, making it not simply an expression of
natural life, as are other associations such as the family and
the village, but rather an almost divine expression of good life.
In other words, proportionality is key in establishing
perfection, in the form of man's proper end, within the
empirical itself.
The Critique of Pure Reason had a strong influence on Kant's
later account of aesthetic comprehension, and this influence
figures strongly in the ethical implications Kant's aesthetics
share with Aristotle's teleological conception of political
community. Yet the Critique of Judgment poses a question not
asked in the Critique of Pure Reason: On what basis is it
determined what of the multitudinous empirical world, full of
sensory shocks and vague and diffuse matter, will count as a
part of an object-form? That is, what of the sensible, empirical
world around us will register as perceptible? The Critique of
Pure Reason does insist that what counts is simply that which
can be synthesized, yet just what can be synthesized and
how? Kant's answer, says Smith, is that synthesis occurs by
way of a certain notion of measure.[12] The faculty of
understanding operates through concepts and thus has the
capacity to develop conceptual units of measurement such as
a meter or a foot. The faculty of imagination, however, does
not have concepts at its disposal. Thus, there must be a
sensible measure by which to synthesis parts. One might, for
example, "evaluate a tree in relation to the human body" or
"evaluate the moon rising in terms of a coin held at close
range."[13]
As Smith notes, there is here a moment of phenomenology in
Kant that opens aesthetic comprehension to a kind of dialogue
between the empirical and the transcendental, rather than
simply a communion in one direction alone. One's choice of a
unit of measurement reflects the object to be measured, just
as this unit of measure influences the account of the object
taken. The notion of a sensible unit of measure, then, offers a
distinct notion of proportionality the relation between the
shared, sensory world and one's natural qualities is not
entirely prefigured by one end of the equation. Rather, a bi-
directional exchange occurs. It is this phenomenological
moment of attunement to sensible measure and bi-directional
exchange that leads Kant to an aesthetic encounter with the
sublime, and, I claim, installs in the Critique of Judgment
insights into an aesthetics which would erupt in the form of
what Rancière calls politics, in contrast to the aesthetics which
such an alternative must disrupt.
3. The Percipiendum and the Sublime
Rancière speaks of a people who have no proper place in
Aristotle's political community. As such, there is no part
regarded as theirs by nature to give to or take from a shared
world. Politics is the rare event that occurs when these people
nonetheless forcibly partake (part-take) in that community.
Rancière designates them by the name they were given in
Ancient Rome - the proletariat, the class of people regarded as
contributing only offspring to the community.[14] The
proletariat is thus a group of people rendered without logos.
Here, Rancière follows a line of logic that derives from
Aristotle's account of the slave. This account begins with an
acknowledgement that slaves, just like their masters, exercise
moral virtue and understanding; indeed, they do so just
insofar as they obey their masters. Thus, if slavery is to be
upheld as a natural order, there must be something other than
moral virtue and understanding that gives to a master his
natural claim to rule. It is on the basis of this
acknowledgement, then, that Aristotle asks, "How could it be
proper for the one to rule and the other to be ruled
unconditionally?"[15] That is, how could slavery be proper to
the political community? It is proper, according to Aristotle,
insofar as a slave is different in kind from his master. The
master has a soul with a deliberative capacity, and this gives
him the natural right of rule. The slave has no such capacity,
and although he can understand the reason of his master
(allowing him to obey his master's orders), has no capacity to
reason himself. Thus, following Aristotle, it is only insofar as
the slave obeys his master that he partakes of logos, and in
turn takes a proper place in the political community a place of
subservience.
For Rancière, the proletariat are slaves who have ceased to be
subservient. The proletariat, just like the slaves of Athens, are
rendered without any reason of their own, and "doomed to the
anonymity of work and reproduction."[16] However, the
proletariat make a claim to freedom. In this, they step wholly
outside of the political community's partitioning of the sensible
insofar as they denounce subservience. Yet at the same time
they lay claim to that which belongs only to those with a part
in the political community. The proletariat's claim to freedom,
then, is a political event. It should be noted that Aristotle, too,
contemplated the relation of such people to the political
community. Rancière's proletariat is Aristotle's 'ordinary men,'
those people whom are neither wealthy oligarchs nor noble
aristocracy. Against Plato, Aristotle argues that the place of
these people in the political community is ensured precisely
insofar as these people do have freedom, and thus where the
oligarchs contribute wealth to the community and the nobles
virtue, ordinary men contribute freedom. Rancière's interest,
then, is in showing that Aristotle's ordinary men just are the
slaves whose capacity for equality he previously denied.
Rancière presses two questions: What precisely is it that
freedom brings to the community? And what makes freedom
proper to the people? Beginning with the latter question,
Rancière insists that there is nothing 'proper' about freedom at
all; it is a historical contingency. Freedom is nothing other
than the disobedience of the slaves and/or the abolition of
slavery. Moreover, freedom is not the only property that is
historically contingent. In slavery's illumination as a historical
rather than natural condition, so, too, is illuminated the
contingency of the aristocracy. The aristocracy is no more
virtuous by nature and thus destined to rule over others than
the oligarchs are naturally wealthy. The system of natural
propriety upon which Aristotle orders the political community
is thus thoroughly disrupted by the proletarian claim to
freedom.
Yet despite its impropriety, Rancière insists that freedom still
contributes to the institution of a political community and a
shared sensible world. A claim to freedom is not the same as
either a claim to wealth or nobility. The later assert particular
qualities as proper to s/he who lays the claim, and thus
identify something contributed to the community which in turn
validates a proportional partaking in accordance with the
principles of Aristotelian justice. A claim to freedom,
alternatively, is a partaking immediately, without any
justification by way of a proportional, contributing quality. For
the proletariat to partake of freedom is for the proletariat to
claim it is, by nature, just like both the nobles and the
oligarchs, despite historical conditions that leave them with
nothing to give. Aristotle attempts to correct the teeter-totter-
like imbalance of a mercantile logic in which one party profits
only at another's expense by means of a logic of justice in
which one takes a part in society always in proportion to one's
own natural properties. The proletariat's claim to freedom
upsets this balance by insisting on the artifice of that upon
which it is grounded - a strict correlation between one's social
position and one's natural capacities.
I apply this conclusion to refute that of Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason. The structure of the sensible, empirical world has a
way of reverberating from its own conditions, that is, from
those structures of human subjectivity Kant speaks of as a
priori. Although Kant's a priori structures are intended to mark
out universal structures of all human experience, and to show
that these structures are simply those which are necessary in
order to understand and draw together the elements of
sensory experience, Rancière's account of the historical
construction of the sensible hints that Kant's a priori structures
are already too historically embedded to be universal. On the
other hand, however, Rancière's attention to the eruption of
voices, of sights, of people, and more, unsanctioned by any
historical partitioning of the sensible - in other words,
Rancière's insistence that politics can and does happen - may
not be unlike Kant's encounter with a distinct aesthetics via
the sublime in Critique of Judgment. Both Rancière's account
of politics and Kant's attention to the sublime in the Critique of
Judgment illuminate a power of sensible expression over and
above any sensus communis, yet they do so without
disavowing altogether a shared sensory world. Both illuminate
a capacity for sense and its eruption that holds regardless of
historically contingent and qualitatively determinable
properties, such as a recognizable capacity for logos as lodged
within the very push towards a shared, sensory world. In
Rancière words, "It is through the existence of this part of
those who have no part, of this nothing that is all, that the
community exists as a political community . . . that is, as
divided by a fundamental dispute. . . to do with the counting
of the community's parts."[17]
Perception's requisite of a sensible unit of measure,
encountered in the aesthetic comprehension of the beautiful,
sets up a path to the sublime. This two-way relation between
the mental faculty of imagination and the sensible world opens
sense experience to constant variation as new units of
measure emerge. Thus the constancy of a shared sensory
world is called into question. In a sensible world of constant
variation, what could be constantly the same not only
everywhere and for everyone but even for our own senses and
faculties? Here, the sublime comes crashing in. The sublime is
a mode of aesthetic comprehension occurring precisely when
one experiences the harmonious relation between one's
various faculties and senses being overturned. Indeed, an
experience of the variation of a sensible measure is only a
minor form of such loss. It can happen not only that sensible
units of measure vary in accordance with the phenomena but,
moreover, that for a particular phenomenon there is no
commensurable measure. Further still, insofar as it is a
sensible unit of measure that is necessary for the synthesis of
empirical parts in accordance with an object-form, an
experience of the sublime is one in which there is no synthesis.
The parts cannot be counted, and a form cannot be produced.
Without an object-form, there can be no sensus communis; no
shared sensory ground that renders the object encountered
the same for all of the senses and all mental faculties. Here
emerges a serious problem for the Kantian system. While the
cogito remains its own kind of sensus communis, a form of
reason universalizable across all human life, it loses the
analogue by which it would reach expression in the ethical
organization of sensory experience, putting each sense and
faculty in its proper place. In the sensible measure, then,
Smith writes that Kant discovers the foundation of the sensus
communis at the same time that he also discovers the fragility
of this foundation.[18] This discovery is well articulated using
Rancière's terminology: At the very foundation of common
sense, there is a part played by that which cannot be counted,
and it is in an aesthetic encounter with this part that politics
occurs. Given that for Rancière this part is played by living,
breathing people, is it crucial to highlight a correlation
between formation and recognition embedded in Kant's
philosophy all along. For the transcendental form of the cogito
to express itself in the empirical world and give to this world
its higher expression through form requires that this world can
be rendered perceptible in accordance with that analogue of
the cogito, the object-form. That is, the formation of the
sensible world is always conditioned by recognition. Just as, on
Rancière's account, in order to take part in the common world,
one's words must be recognized by others as intelligible
sounds rather than mere noise, so too for an object to take
form, it is necessary that one can imagine and conceive as
well as see and smell the same birth tree.
Drawing on this correlation in Kant, it becomes evident that in
order for the proletariat - the part of those who have no part -
to not simply disrupt the sensible world but to partake of it.
There must be a capacity for sense without recognition.
Something in the Kantian sublime speaks to this. At the
moment when the faculty of imagination is confronted with its
fragility in the face of the world, the faculties are forced to
stretch beyond themselves. It is this higher power that Kant
speaks of as the Ideas, and where previously the faculties
operated in the name of the cogito, the "I think," they hereby
come to operate in the name of the cogitandum: that which
ought be thought.
If one is to follow Rancière's politics in a philosophical key and
pose the question not only of what politics is but of what being
is so that politics may come about, would one find that it is
only the movement in being from the cogito to the cogitandum
that allows for politics? First, it should be borne in mind that it
is the faculty of imagination, in its requirement for a sensible
rather than a conceptual measure that encounters the
sublime. This allows Kant to conceive of the cogitandum as a
higher power of transcendental reason that comes into full
force in a moment when the faculties more closely tethered to
the sensible are revealed as too frail to communicate with the
transcendental. The sublime shows a faculty of the mind
surpassing every standard of sense insofar as it reveals that
"all the might of the imagination[is] still inadequate to
reason's ideas."[19] In other words, a measure equal to the
world can always be conceived, although not always imagined.
Kant's philosophy remains in the end convinced that there will
always be an a priori form which makes the sensible possible.
Conceived along these Kantian lines, then, the cogitandum
does not open being to the possibility of politics but rather
operates to elide the political event.
Yet to invoke Smith's insights once more, to posit something
that can be thought but not imagined is to encounter a
moment of discord between the faculties.[20] This moment of
discord would be a moment of experience outside the
dominion of common sense. Moreover - and this is key - its
discovery by way of a sensible measure entails that this
moment is sensible nonetheless. Uncovered here is a kind of
sensibility distinct from that which partitions the world so as to
render one sensible only within one's proper place, a
sensibility without recognition. To follow this insight further, I
turn to Deleuze. In Deleuze's rendition of this moment, the
cogitandum appears when the faculty of understanding,
pushing imagination to always find a measure, pushes
imagination to its very limit and, at this limit, the imagination
pushes back, leading the understanding itself to acquire a
distinct power. Here, discord is understood as itself a kind of
communication and, moreover, is revealed to be lodged within
an orientation towards common sense.[21] Finally, whereas
previously common sense was the goal and the end of
communion between the senses and faculties, the end here is
the generation of a higher form of each of these. For Kant's
movement from the cogito to the cogitandum, Deleuze offers
a like movement from the sensible to the sentiendum, from
the perceptible to the percipiendum, and more.
Here, I stress the last of these. The movement from the
perceptible to the percipiendum is a movement from that
which is only perceptible on the condition of the object-form,
and its correlated sensus communis, to that which, as Deleuze
insists, must be perceived, i.e. to that which "cannot but be
perceived."[22] Note that Deleuze translates Kant's ought to a
must. In this, he gives to the percipiendum an imperative
force resonant with Rancière's politics. The percipiendum is
that which forcibly erupts; it cannot but be perceived,
whatever the community's will. This imperative power comes
from a force of life unrecognizable according to the partitions
of the sensible, and what is generated is a sense of that which
is insensible and imperceptible in the community. Contrary to
Rancière's denunciation of Deleuze's philosophy on the whole
and his theory of 'imperceptibility' in particular, I argue that is
just what Deleuze has captured and illustrated under this
heading and that forces us to perceive precisely that which is
unrecognizable - the part of those who have no part.[23] The
import of this argument is not just to establish that Rancière's
criticisms miss the political potential in Deleuze's work, but
also give Rancière's 'Politics of Aesthetics' a philosophical
backbone that holds up against those critics who ask how the
imperceptible and the insensible can be or become perceptible
and sensible.
4. From the Imperceptible to Politics
If Deleuze's inversion of Kant offers to Rancière's politics, first,
its affirmation as a potential within being as such and, second,
an amplification of its claim to a crucial correlation between
aesthetics and politics, what is to be done with Rancière's
critique of Deleuze? Where Rancière's aesthetics of politics
leads him ultimately to Deleuze, Deleuze, according to
Rancière, leads politics ultimately to an impasse. There are
several facets to Rancière's critique. However, Deleuze's
notion of the imperceptible and its situation at the foundation
of what Deleuze describes as a new kind of relationality, I
argue, is the key. Rancière, I submit, has missed the force of
this notion. The imperceptible is only so from the perspective
of the sensus communis, and this perspective, despite Kant's
efforts, may in the end be simply too empirical for politics or
ethics. In other words, it is from an all too empirical
perspective that the eruptive force of the imperceptible, a
living force and perhaps the force of a certain people, is
missed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and even in certain
stages of his Critique of Judgment. Deleuze offers the notion
of the 'imperceptible' or the percepiendum as a means to
illuminates Kant's empiricism, its costs, as well as an
alternative. Moreover, this Deleuzian move illuminates a
distinct aesthetics that may well be much like what Rancière
conceives of as politics.
It is in "Deleuze, Bartleby, and the Literary Formula" that
Rancière concludes Deleuze's philosophy erects an impasse for
politics. There are two interlocking tenets to this conclusion.
The first of these derives from the value Deleuze assigns to
the powers of being and the possibilities they entail for living,
expressed and exemplified through the literary figure of
Melville's 'Bartleby.' The second derives from a certain
metaphysics in which these possibilities are inscribed,
expressed in the image offered by Deleuze of the world as "a
wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every element has a
value in itself but also in relation to others."[24] Both tenets
converge in drawing heavily on the Deleuzian notion of the
imperceptible.
For Deleuze, as described in his "Bartleby; Or, the Formula,"
the story of Bartleby is the story of the direct effects had upon
the life of the protagonist when he develops a peculiar habit.
Bartleby is a clerk in an attorney's office. The habit he
develops is that of responding, when asked by the attorney to
perform a particular task, "I would prefer not to." What are
these effects and what in the nature of this utterance produces
them? Deleuze begins with the second question, remarking on
the indeterminacy of Bartleby's expression: that it ends with
"not to" leaves open the object of the renunciation. Without an
object specified, Deleuze stresses that it is not only that which
Bartleby does not prefer that remains indeterminate but,
insofar as the specificity of the one requires that of the other,
that which he prefers as well. With both Bartleby's preferences
and non-preferences indeterminate, the two themselves
becomes almost indistinguishable from one another. This
effect is multiplied by the indeterminacy of the statement not
only with regard to its object but also with regard to
affirmation and negation. To prefer not to is to neither refuse
a particular task nor to accept it. In the end, then, the effect
of the formula is to produce a state of suspension, a state in
which it is indeterminate what will and will not be done.
Bartleby only expresses preference, thus never affirming
concretely what he will or will not do and, on top of this, never
affirms concretely what it is that he does and does not prefer,
rendering what might be expected of him still further
indeterminate.
In a regime of the sensible partitioned such that one is to
make, say, see, and do in accordance with predetermined
properties and correlative proper places, such indeterminacy
may have noteworthy effects. Indeed, it is of import that
Bartleby repeats this phrase in his workplace and in response
to the tasks demanded of him by his employer. As Deleuze
notes, to refuse his required task would transport Bartleby
from one social position to another, from employee to derelict.
Yet by first leaving indeterminate his preferences and, second,
insisting on nonetheless only preferring, he escapes social
positioning.
However, on Rancière's account of politics such an effect may
be no effect at all. An effect marks a change in the state of the
world, and Bartleby, through this formula, mightn't change a
thing. Rather, he may only cast his lot in with that of those
cast, in the partitioning off of the sensible, into an almost
unbearable state, one in which these people cease to register
within the community. At its best, however, such an effect
interrupts the operations of these partitions, much as, to find
an analogy in the work of Kant, an aesthetic encounter with
the sublime interruptions the organization of the faculties and
senses. Here, Rancière's offers this summary: "The formula
erodes the attorney's reasonable organization of work and life.
It shatters not just the hierarchies of a world but also what
supports them: the connections between causes and effects
we expect from that world, between the behaviors and
motives we attribute to them and the means we have to
modify them."[25]
Yet to interrupt the functioning of the regime of common sense
is not yet to render sensible a missing part, the part of those
who cannot be recognized in such partitions. If there is any
hope for politics in Bartleby's formula, this formula must not
only have the potential to disrupt the sensible order but must
also have the potential to found a distinct kind of sense.
Rancière finds Deleuze hopeful regarding the prospects of just
such a founding. Indeed, as Rancière will emphasize, Deleuze
posits Bartleby's formula as precisely the seed from which
Melville's story develops. In so doing, he instantiates a
commitment to the view that from this formula, a formula
disrupting the partitions of the sensible and rendering Bartleby
unlocatable within them, a new expression of the sensible - a
new literature -- can indeed emerge.
Such a view requires philosophical interrogation, as Deleuze is
well aware. Looking to explain how a sensible expression, and,
indeed, an aesthetic object such as a story can be generated
from a formula that, if only in its first effect, disrupts the
sensible, Deleuze turns to the radical empiricism of William
James. It is in this engagement with James that Deleuze offers
the image of the world by which Rancière is so intrigued, the
world as "a wall of loose, uncemented stones."[26] However,
where Deleuze finds in this image of radical empiricism the
support for a new kind of literature and a new form of
relationality, Rancière finds a metaphysics that is the impasse
into which Deleuze sends any hope of politics hurtling.
Rancière's The Politics of Aesthetics highlights the long-
standing accounts of aesthetic production, such as Aristotle's,
that have taken the properties of various subjects,
predetermined by nature, to be the causal and formative force
from which any narrative, that is, any ordering of the sensible,
can unfold. This incites a political question: By what power
might a narrative unfold in the absence of a subject with
determinate capacities? In the history of literary theory, this
question has been answered is several ways, yet all are, for
Rancière, versions of one and the same contention: There is a
causal power within matter itself and thus no heteronymous
power, such as that of predetermined subjects' forms, is
necessary to generate works of art. Introduced here is a kind
of individuation distinct from that offered by either by Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason or by Aristotle. Whereas for both of
these philosophers, a faculty of the soul and an a priori power
of the subject, respectively, give to matter its sensible form,
here, individuations are immanent within matter itself.
Rancière draws on Flaubert's Saint Anthony to exemplify these
new individuations. An individuation can now be "a drop of
water, a shell, a strand of hair." Moreover, these individuations
are immediately felt. Their impact is to render us "stopped
short, eyes fixed. . . heart open."[27]
Yet this conception of matter, for Rancière, leading to the
inauguration of a distinct metaphysics as well as a distinct
aesthetic regime, does not facilitate any politics. Indeed,
Rancière's employment of Flaubert bears Deleuze in mind.
Deleuze, in A Thousand Plateaus, speaks of like individuations
as 'imperceptible.' These individuations are of matter in its
own genetic self-expression, and hold the key to a kind of
relationality William James' speaks of as a radical empiricism.
Sticking closely to the frame of aesthetic theory, Rancière will
address this as an answer to a persisting problem. While such
individuations, as Flaubert characterizes them, may be felt and
are thus in some form sensible, it remains unclear what such
individuations could contribute to the production of a work of
art. Rancière asks what "can string a necklace from those
'pearls' that Saint Anthony supplied loose?" such that a new
kind of literature, inseparable from a new kind of community,
might come about.[28] Here, many versions of aesthetics will,
in the end, remain Aristotelian. A harmony vested in natural
properties of the soul will be subtly reinstated in order to hold
the pieces together or, in other words, to create a political
community.
Deleuze's efforts by way of the notion of radical empiricism,
then, are rare and, moreover, bear political community in
mind, as Rancière is quick to acknowledge. In the potential to
string the pearls together without recourse to Aristotelian
proportionality lies "the promise of a people to come," as
Rancière writes.[29] Bartleby's formula sets the stage for this
by upsetting a metaphysics partitioning the sensible through
an external and static law of natural properties and proper
relations and, moreover, positing in its place the immanent
power of the sensible to express itself. Bartleby's formula just
is a series of imperceptible individuations. In this, Rancière
sees all bodies rendered equal, the site of the same genetic
power. This is a rendering in which the proletariat, understood
via the sensus communis, or the distribution of the sensible,
as the part that has no part, are granted something in
common with others.
However, this equality in and of itself is not sufficient for the
entry into the community of a people that is missing in its
current form. Here, Rancière insists that it is crucial to not
simply substitute one metaphysics for another - a metaphysics
that finds in matter its own genetic force for a metaphysics of
static and predetermined forms that render sensible passive
matter - but to bring these two worlds together. Indeed, in
focusing on the character of Bartleby in his engagement with
Melville's story, Rancière again notes that such a concern
seems evident in Deleuze. Bartleby is the site at which the
genetic power of matter in itself can enter into combat with a
world that is structured in elision of such power. Bartleby,
writes Rancière, is the figure who "make[s] the power of 'the
other world' effective as the power that destroys this
world."[30]
According to Deleuze, it is from these ashes that arises the
new kind of relationality indicative of James' radical
empiricism. Whereas a traditional empiricism understands the
empirical as the domain of discrete parts, at the heart of
James' philosophy is the contention that relations are not
derivations of a mental operation upon the raw data of sense
experience, as Kant asserts by way of his account of
syntheses. Rather, relations are themselves immediately
sensed. Indeed, they are only sensed. Brian Massumi captures
this insight in James: "relationality. . . registers materially in
the activity of the body before it registers consciously" and
thus "we do not run because we are afraid, but we are afraid
because we run."[31] Immediately sensed relations, then, are
of a world wherein, to follow the terms Rancière takes from
Flaubert, the pearls not only individuate themselves but string
themselves together.
Indeed, the pearls only individuate themselves in this very
relationality. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is helpful here.
He offers as exemplary the phenomenon of two contrasting
colors appearing side by side, each intensifying each other and
generating their value in this, such that, as Claudel writes,"a
certain blue of the sea is so blue that only blood would be
more red."[32] Deleuze himself offers just the image Rancière
employs to crystallize his reservations about the political
potential in Deleuze's philosophy; the image of a wall
composed of 'loose, uncemented stones.' Such an image
emphasizes the import of interrelations to the being of the
phenomena, yet these interrelations do not form a whole
fusing parts into a proper and immutable place. Rather, they
form a whole world of individuations existing only in relation
with others.
Yet Rancière is not satisfied. He asks, "Why does the image of
the whole in motion. . . have to be the image of a wall?"[33]
Is not a wall rather the kind of thing that would "bar the road.
. . of the people to come"? For Rancière, the fact that
Deleuze's account of literature ends with this wall gives cause
to ask once more after the very mode of existence his sojourn
in Melville's text began with the mode of existence exemplified
in the character of Bartleby and his formula. Where before,
Rancière, following Deleuze, emphasized Bartleby's
indiscernibility, here he puts the onus on what can aptly be
called Bartleby's imperceptiblity. Bartleby is not only a
character who, through his formula, escapes location within
the partitions of the sensible which would assign to him a
proper place and, accordingly, proper tasks. In addition, he is
a character who literally goes unperceived.
On his very first day at work for the attorney, Bartleby is given
as his workspace an enclave within the office of the attorney
himself. On one side of this enclave are the doors leading out
of the office, on another a window that looks out only onto the
wall of another building, and, finally, on the other is a high-
rising screen. In such a situation, then, Bartleby both does not
see the attorney and goes unseen by him. Moreover, when
Bartleby utters his formula, it is generally followed, as Deleuze
writes, by a retreat "behind his partition."[34] It is in this
situation that Bartleby, for Rancière, is rendered imperceptible
and unperceiving in the shared world. In the end, Rancière
cannot find in this imperceptiblity that which would be sensible
without being re-cognized according to a priori forms;
Rancière cannot find any suggestion of a new sensible world
Deleuze would give to a missing people. Rancière concludes,
"The strength of every strong thought is. . .its ability to
arrange its aporia itself, the point where it can no longer pass.
And that is indeed what Deleuze does. . . clears the way of
Deleuzianism and sends it into the wall."[35]
Thus, to respond to Rancière's critique, it is crucial to
investigate the notion of imperceptibility in Deleuze. The
individuations which characterize his distinct metaphysics are
indeed given this name. However, to be imperceptible is, for
Deleuze, a very different thing from not being available
perceptually. Just as, for James, relationality is only
immediately felt rather than always already conceptualized, so
too for Deleuze are these imperceptible individuations only
sensed and perceived. Moreover, they are always and only
sensible in relation to others. Each pushes against another,
and it is through this discordant communication with one
another that each forces itself sensibly upon us. It should be
noted that such discord is only possible, as the brief moment
of phenomenology in Kant suggests, on the condition that the
communication conditional to sense experience is bi-
directional, and thus there is no faculty that acts without itself
being acted upon. In other words, the sensing subject and not
just the sensible must be organized like Deleuze's wall.
Deleuze's imperceptible, then, is a force that registers within
the common world its outside, that which can only be
perceived, by way of bi-directional communication. Hence, the
imperceptible for Deleuze just is the percipiendum, that of the
perceptible that presents itself when our perception and the
sensus communis, both among our faculties and senses and at
the heart of political community, are pushed to their limit.
Deleuze's notion of the imperceptible, then, crystallizes and
further illuminates a moment in Kant's Critique of Judgment
that turns the aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason on its
head. This moment, I propose, may well open it to politics as
Rancière understands it.
What's more, Deleuze seeks in the percipiendum a model for a
kind of communication and an example of a certain sensible
force that goes unperceived from an all too empirical
perspective, whether a perspective that, a lá Aristotle,
develops a metaphysics that naturalizes historically contingent
parts and properties or, a lá Kant, develops a theory of
transcendental subjectivity according to a logic that is itself
founded on a particular historical organization of the sensible.
Drawing on the work of Duns Scotus, Deleuze gives to the
imperceptible individuations that compose his wall the name of
'haeccities.' Haec is the Greek term for 'this,' and to speak of
haeccities is to speak of the "thisness" of being. The onus on a
kind of indeterminacy in the term is key, for haeccities are
non-qualitative properties. Qualities are too empirical in the
traditional sense, too distinct and concrete in and of
themselves, to capture the discordant force that marks the
always-relational individuation of a haeccity.
Duns Scotus comes to the notion of 'haeccities' in asking how
it is that we not only distinguish one kind of thing from
another, such as a human from an animal, but also distinguish
instantiations of the same kind of thing, one's child, for
example, as an instantiation of a more general human being.
The fact that things can share natures and yet remain distinct
requires that a real property other than a thing's nature be in
force in its being. It is in asking first after what cannot be
instantiated, that is, divided into several things each of which
remains the thing itself, that Scotus's notion of haecceities
begins to develop, for it is here that the real property in being
preventing the perfect collapse of two human beings into one
general form might be witnessed.[36] There is something in
the property of temperature or of pressure, for example, just
as there is in an individual human being, which is absolutely
incompatible with division into several parts each of which is
an instance of the thing itself. While we may be able to divide
these properties into parts, this cannot be done without
changing the nature of the thing. For example, if we take
away half the heat of a pot of water at 100 degrees
centigrade, we will no longer have a pot of boiling water. There
is a real property that exists in this state of the water that is
not divisible such that each of the parts it separates into
remains an instance of itself.
That there is a real property in being indivisible without a
change in kind suggests that something very like James'
notion of relationality is at play in the real properties of being
Scotus names 'haeccities.' Moreover, these properties,
although not empirical in a traditional sense, are not strictly
transcendental, they figure in the sensible, corporeal domain.
Here it is Spinoza whom Deleuze turns to in order to further
stress the point. A body, for Spinoza, is not first and foremost
a distinct extension of matter but rather a set of orientations
in movement and rest. For example, take a soap bubble. As
Manuel De Landa tells us, the constituent molecules of this
bubble "are constrained energetically to 'seek' the point at
which surface tension is minimized."[37] In Spinoza's terms,
this is a pattern of movement and rest that grows from within
the collective molecules and through their energy, and it is this
pattern that generates the soup bubble's extensive, empirical
form.
In addition, a number of empirical shapes and forms might be
generated from one intensive pattern. Again, Manuel De Landa
is helpful: "if instead of molecules of soap we have the atomic
components of an ordinary salt crystal, the form that emerges
from minimizing energy. . . is a cube."[38] Thus one can be
sure that it is not the extensive parts, even if approached on a
scale smaller than that of the soap bubble or salt cube itself -
the scale of soap or salt molecules -- that are the force of
behind its self-organization. Rather, organizational force
derives from the relation that holds between the parts before
they are even broken down into distinct parts. Spinoza again
corroborates Deleuze's conclusion. For Spinoza, relations of
movement and rest are only one of two halves to any body.
The other he will call the body's affectivity. Affectivity is what
gives to these relations their force to communicate with other
such relations in the world, for affectivity is indissoluble from
an expenditure outward, bringing the body into contact with
these others, in an effort to endure, to preserve the particular
relations of movement and rest that give to it its own being.
What, then, is a force of self-organization that develops only
through exchange and communication with the non-self? Here,
it is helpful to think of Duns Scotus' insight, that there is in the
world a real property indivisible without a change in nature,
but in reverse. The force of affectivity is a force allowing
intensities differing in nature to nonetheless be condensed into
a whole which itself differs in nature from each of these
intensities. Thus, the body's effort to endure always takes the
form of a forcible communion between incommensurables,
producing new intensities and reconfiguring the old. What
Spinoza calls 'affectivity,' always tethered to relations of
movement and rest, is then precisely the capacity which
Deleuze finds holding forth the promise of a people to come,
the promise of a new kind of community and, indissolubly, a
new kind of sense.
Deleuze's concern in developing the notion of the
'imperceptible,' then, is with illuminating this world of
communication without common sense, a world in which the
sensible is constituted through the holding together of that
which differs in kind. Haeccities, the loose stones in Deleuze's
wall, are indeed imperceptible, yet only from a traditional
empirical perspective that reduces the perceptible to discrete
and extended matter, matter, that is, without intensity or
affectivity. This empirical account of the perceptible has the
object-form, and thus, in turn, the transcendental cogito, as
its condition. It is this form that renders the sensible the same
despite divisions between the senses, the faculties,
perspectives, and more, and thus institutes what Rancière will
speak of as community. A wall of "loose, uncemented stones,"
in contrast, is a whole world outside this domain insofar as to
divide these stones from their relations is to alter their nature.
This world is the world of the percipiendum, that which must
be perceived. Just as yellow and blue vanish from sight upon
reaching a critical point of proximity with one another,
changing in nature to produce green, relations of critical
proximity produce every discrete element available to
perception. 'Imperceptible' individuations constitute the
perceived, and the perceived here forces itself upon our body
just like a color so bright one cannot turn one's eyes from it.
Moreover, there is a further implication to Deleuze's Kantian
inversion. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason posits the "I think"
as the control centre responsible for the organization of sense
experience in which each faculty and sensory apparatus has a
proper function, and develops a conception of the a priori and
of aesthetics accordingly. It is precisely the functioning of such
a control center productive of a proper and harmonious
organization of senses, faculties, and parts that radical
empiricism, indissoluble from the percipiendum, renders
difficult.
Rancière's attention to an aesthetics of politics may surprise
us. Yet aesthetics has long been a field of inquiry that looks to
sense experience to ask after value. Aesthetics asks how value
is expressed sensibly and how we know when value is
present.[39] Rancière is clearly responding to Foucault's
analysis of the modern invention of the disciplines,
distinguishing aesthetic value from ethics, social and political
values from the evaluation of sense experience, and more,
when he posits aesthetics both at what is at stake in politics
and at what erupts anew when politics happens. The intentions
of this paper, centered around Rancière's call for a Politics of
Aesthetics, have been twofold. First, it has aimed to
demonstrate how Kant's critical philosophy, particularly as
developed in the Critique of Pure Reason, corroborates
Rancière's analysis of the distribution of the sensible.
Simultaneously, however, it argues that Kant's Critique of
Judgment, approached through a Deleuzian lens, opens to a
distinctly political aesthetics as defined by Rancière. Second, it
argues that an eye to the role Kant's Critique of Judgment
plays in Deleuze's formulation of the notion of the
'imperceptible,' key to Deleuze's own call for politics in A
Thousand Plateaus, can not only reconcile Deleuze's
philosophy with Rancière's politics but can, in fact, render
Rancière's call for a 'Politics of Aesthetics' both more
convincing, urgent, and important.
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